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Abstract 
We analyse retrospective time judging from a survey of more than fifty 
thousand reviews. Subjects were told to verbally estimate the time they had 
been waiting in the lounge until they entered the consulting room. The 
estimations ranged from 0 to 300 minutes. Our aim is to test whether 
subjects use round numbers when estimating time. We find that the round 
number is 5, although for longer intervals of time, the round number 
increases to 15, 30 and 60 minutes. 
Keywords: Retrospective Time Perception, Verbal Estimation, Round Numbers. 
 
 
“What then is time? If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to 
explain it, I do not know”. Back to the fourth century, St. Augustine (354-430) 
quite rightly pointed out the difficulty in tackling the subtle issue of defining 
what “time” is. But even without having a precise definition, we all do 
experience the passage of time in everyday life. For example, when attending 
an economics class, we do notice when the class starts and when the class is 
over, and then we realise that the “time” of the class is over. Also, from time 
to time we do eat food and later on, we feel hungry again, realising in this way 
that we have been some “time” without taking food. 
 
However, the perception of time, and more specifically how we do 
perceive time, is actually a tricky issue. Again, our everyday life reveals us that 
there are no sensory receptors for time (i.e. we do not hear time or see time). 
In fact, if we were prevented from our senses, we could still notice the passage 
of time for example, through the changing of our thoughts. 
 
All this suggests that we basically realise the passage of time by means of 
other things which we perceive, much of them through our senses. These 
experiences of time have been analysed by Pöppel (1978), who isolated a 
number of elementary time experiences; among these we find (i) duration, (ii) 
non-simultaneity, (iii) order, (iv) past and present and (v) changes. For an 
introduction to these elementary time perceptions, see Le Poidevin (2000). 
 
We shall be concerned with one of these fundamental aspects of our 
experience of time: the duration. In the estimation of the duration of an event 
or of the time elapsed, our brain needs two pieces of information: the time of 
the beginning of the event, which is actually in our memory, and the time of 
the end of the event, which might also be in our memory. Then the brain forms 
a belief about the duration. 
 
The formation of these beliefs about temporal duration can be analysed 
from different perspectives. From an physiological point of view, we might be 
interested on the complex dynamics of the neuronal pathways involved as well 
as on the neuromuscular system.1 Also, this issue admits a metaphysic point of 
view. In the philosophy of time there is an ample debate on whether time itself 
                                                 
1 Specifically, it is known that the prefrontal cortex (in the frontal lobe) plays a fundamental role in temporal 
processing, as well as the cerebellum. 
or some aspects of it (i.e. passage of time) are unreal, without objective 
counterparts in the real world. Tensed theorists proclaim that the passage of 
time is an objective fact whereas untensed theorists deny it.2  
 
And of course, Psychology has a prominent say in this issue, which is 
easily noticed by the large amount of experimental research conducted. In this 
area, there are two basic paradigms: (i) Prospective: Subjects are explicitly 
told in advance that they will be required to judge the duration of an interval, 
usually lasting less than 60 seconds, and (ii) Retrospective: Subjects are not 
given any prior warning about time judgements. Its focus is on memory and 
the time interval ranges from 60 seconds to several minutes. For a discussion 
of the methodology and the terminology involved in the analysis of time 
judgements, the reader is referred to Bindra and Waksberg (1956). For a 
modern analysis of both prospective and retrospective methods, see Block and 
Zakay (1997). 
 
Our contribution is to analyse the phenomenon of the estimation of time 
from an economic point of view. We all have experienced that time is a 
relevant variable attached to economic goods: When we step into a restaurant 
and order our meal, it is needless to say that we want to take it in that precise 
moment, and we get really annoyed if food is not served quickly. An economic 
good as simple as “having dinner out” has plenty of dimensions to consider: 
The comfortableness of the chairs, the atmosphere, the variety of the menu, 
the quality of the food... and also several dimensions related to time, as the 
time of standing in a queue for getting seated, the time of being served, the 
time of getting the check or the bill, etc.  
 
This example makes plain that the way we perceive the passing of time 
affects the way we perceive the economic goods and the way we assess them. 
And these assessments of the economic goods will affect our economic choices, 
under the widely accepted economic paradigm that subjects choices are 
optimal, in the sense that they are their most preferred alternatives. 
 
Once the perception of time is recognised as having an important 
economic impact, we can imaging ourselves telling to some friends how much 
time we were waiting for the food in a particular restaurant. I have to admit 
that I would hardly say 37 minutes, or 21 minutes. I imagine myself as 
selecting a rounder number. 
 
In fact, a well known fact in Experimental Economics is that individuals 
tend to choose round numbers when asked to select a number.3 For example, 
when subjects are asked to choose which will be the maximum amount of 
                                                 
2 A challenging question for tenseless theory is to explain why, if it is true that time does not pass in reality, 
it appears to us as passing. 
3 See Albers and Albers (1983) and Albers (1997) for a Theory of Prominence in the decimal system for 
accounting for these observations. Also Selten (1997) for an empirical application of these ideas. Our 
approach here is in the spirit of these papers although we do not restrict ex ante the set of prominent 
numbers. 
money they will pay for some commodity, or when subjects are asked to say 
their monetary contribution to a public good, answers tend to be round 
numbers. But this fact is not specific to economic situations; it has also been 
observed in non-economic questions, as for example, in answers to the 
question on how many inhabitants Madrid has. In this situation, it is rarely 
observed an answer like 3,547,345 individuals. 
 
Our purpose is to analyse whether people also use round numbers in time 
judgement. To this end, we develop a model based on the use of scales for 
generating round numbers. A scale is defined by two numbers: the origin and 
the base. In our case, the origin is taken to be 0 and the base is taken to be 
any positive integer number. Given the scale and the waiting time, the 
individual selects the closest multiple of the base to the waiting time. This way, 
the scale generates numbers which are multiples of the base, i.e. round 
numbers. 
 
For each possible scale we calculate two indexes: The success index, 
defined as the percentage of observations which are multiples of the base, and 
the parsimony index, defined as the percentage of numbers which are 
multiples of the base. We then define the optimal scale as the scale with the 
largest difference between the success and the parsimony indexes. 
 
We apply this methodology to a survey of 52,200 personal interviews on 
waiting times in Primary Medical Public Centres in Andalusia for the period 
2000-2002. We do find that for the whole sample of waiting times ranging 
from 0 to 300 minutes, the optimal scale is based on the number 5. But when 
attention is restricted to sub-samples starting on different multiples of 5, we do 
find that the size of the optimal base increases in the sequence 15-30-60. 
Thus, for intervals of time shorter than 15 minutes, the optimal base is 5, 
whereas for intervals of time between 15 minutes and one hour, the optimal 
scale increases to 15 minutes. Larger periods of time reveal a scale of 30 and 
60 minutes. 
 
Given that the key economic variable is not the real elapsed time but the 
perceived time and that people discretize time when judging it, the efforts 
directed to reducing waiting time may be unperceived by the economic 
subjects. The discretization of time must be an important phenomenon 
worthwhile to taking into account when assessing the appropriateness of 
modifying the time variables attached to economics goods or services aimed at 
improving their quality. 
 
 
The Use of Scales 
Our database comes from the study “Health Service in Andalusia: 
Improving Patient Satisfaction”. This survey was done by the Andalusian Social 
Studies Institute (CSIC, Spain) with the financial support from the Andalusian 
Regional Government. The total sample consists of 52,200 personal interviews. 
These interviews were done from September 2,000 to January 2,002. Each 
questionnaire comprised more than fifty items, referring to a variety of 
questions related to public provision of health care. Among them, item 40 
asked: 
How much time has elapsed since you came to the medical centre 
until you entered into the consulting room? 
_______ minutes 
Our sample consists of 46,841 answers to this question, disseminated 
within the interval 0-300 minutes; in particular 2,496 individuals did not wait 
and 44,345 did wait. Figure 1 illustrates the absolute frequencies of the 
variable waiting time up to 60 minutes. 
Figure 1: Waiting time (histogram) 
A visual inspection of the distribution of waiting time reveals that subjects 
mainly use numbers which are multiple of 5 (in fact, 42,382 observations 
(95.57%) are multiple of five). However there are also multiples of 2, 3, 10 
and 15, as next figure displays, all of them in a share above the 45% of the 
numerical answers. For example, 63% of the observations are even numbers. 
Figure 2: Multiples 
The way in which we investigate the use of round numbers is the 
assumption that individuals use scales. A scale is defined by the origin, which 
in our case is taken to be zero, and the base, i.e. the positive integer used as 
the basis of the numeration scale. For a given waiting time, the individual will 
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select the multiple of the base which is closest to the waiting time. This way, a 
given base will generate observations which are integer multiples of the base. 
For selecting among different scales, we will use one of the basic 
principles of the scientific method: "A theory is better the more it predicts and 
the less it assumes." We construct an index for measuring the predictive power 
(“the more it predicts”) and the parsimony (“the less it assumes”) of a given 
scale. The success of a scale is calculated by the percentage of observations 
which are multiple of the base. The parsimony of the scale is defined as the 
percentage of numbers which are multiples of the base. 
We finally combine these two indexes to yield a unique index. To this 
end, we use the following reasoning: Assume that we had a collection of 
numbers which are not generated by a scale but they are generated uniformly 
in a given interval. Then, for any scale, the success index will be the same as 
the parsimony index. Hence, the larger the difference between the success  
and the parsimony indexes, the larger the occurrence of observations which 
are multiples of the base beyond the randomly uniform model, and therefore 
the better the scale. This overall index will be named the Ockham's index in 
honour of the English scholastic William of Ockham (1285-1347) who stated 
the principle Non sunt multiplicanda entia praeter necessitatem (entities are 
not to be multiplied beyond necessity). 
Next figure displays the Ockham's index for the entire sample. We see 
that the scale whose base is 5 attains the larger Ockham's index (50,78%), 
and it is therefore selected as the base used by the subjects in our sample. 
Figure 3. Ockham’s Index for the entire sample 
We next explore whether the base used by the individuals is related to 
the size of the time to be estimated. We now compute the Ockham's index for 
different sub-samples, starting at multiples of the optimal base (5) and always 
ending at 300 minutes. Some results are displayed in the following table. 
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SUB-SAMPLE OBSERVATIONS OPTIMAL BASE 
1-300 44,345 5 (50.78%) 
15-300 29,424 15 (54.82%) 
30-300 16,183 15 (67.61%) 
45-300 7,468 15 (70.25%) 
60-300 5,646 30 (73.31%) 
75-300 2,071 30 (61.83%) 
90-300 1,878 30 (67.56%) 
105-300 1,061 60 (66.36%) 
120-300 1,037 60 (64.95%) 
Table 1. Number of observations and optimal bases for different sub-samples.                                  
Ockham’s Index in parenthesis. 
Table 1 shows two salient features. First, the base of the optimal scale is 
endogenous and depends upon the magnitude of the waiting time: the larger 
the time, the larger the base. And second, the different optimal bases are 
related to the system in which our civilisation decided to measure time long 
time ago, i.e. the sexagesimal system: 15, 30 and 60 minutes.  
We can rationalise this pattern of the optimal bases on the following 
basis: When deciding which number to say, the individual uses the first base, 
5. He asks himself whether the waiting time is larger that the first multiple of 
the base. If the answer is positive, he then goes to the second multiple of the 
base, and asks himself the same question. If the answer is positive he then 
goes to the third multiple and asks himself the same question. 
Once the subject has used three times the same base, the individual 
changes it and he uses as the new base the next prominent number in the 
sexagesimal system in order to speed up the process. The process stops when 
the individual has found a number that is not larger than the waiting time. And 
his answer is precisely that number. 
Our methodology of optimal scales needs not be restricted to the 
analysis of the estimation of a waiting time. Other phenomena whose output is 
a numerical answer can be analysed applying our methodology. We leave this 
for future research. 
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